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Power is a major theme in the recent literature on algorithms. Concerns refer, for example, to 
the roles of algorithms in processes of discrimination (Barocas and Selbst, forthcoming), the 
sorting and ordering of populations (Lyon 2003), or the (e)valuation and governance (Aneesh, 
2009; Rouvroy, 2012) of social life. Furthermore, work on algorithms points to their relative 
inaccessibility, which renders both analysis and political intervention notoriously difficult. Alt-
hough we share these concerns, we also find that scholarship on algorithms is often based on 
implicit, underlying assumptions that there is ‘something special’ about algorithms which 
makes them powerful. Lumped together in these assumptions are questions of the ontology, 
agency, and ability of algorithms. In this paper we seek to focus on how we can understand 
algorithms’ agency and power. 
 
What makes algorithms powerful entities? The way we pose this question already points to the 
argument we set out in this paper: by asking ‘what makes algorithms powerful?’ we question 
who and what need to be drawn together to yield effects that are recognizable as powerful. We 
argue that the ‘social power’ of algorithms, just like that of any other artefact, is an effect and 
not a cause of events, and which is not given but needs to be achieved (cf. Latour 1986, 2005). 
Rather than understanding algorithms as having power, an agency through which they create 
an effect, we argue that power derives from algorithmic association. By ‘algorithmic associa-
tion’ we mean the assemblage of people, things, resources and other entities held together by 
practice and process. From this perspective, what algorithms do and how algorithms accom-





We set out our argument drawing on two ethnographies of the development of algorithmic 
surveillance systems. These systems were designed to alert security personnel in transportation 
hubs (i.e. airports, train stations) in case of an undesirable event. Central to these systems were 
algorithmic IF…THEN rules which established the conditions (IF) and consequences (THEN) 
required to produce an effect (such as alert security personnel). However, in our field sites 
neither conditions, nor consequences were inherent to the system; both needed to be achieved 
through the careful plaiting of relatively unstable associations of people, things, processes, 
documents and resources. The continuous work needed to achieve conditions and conse-
quences suggests that we cannot attribute ‘power’ solely to the algorithm as a single entity. 
Rather, the algorithms in our study operated through distributed agency among an array of 
people and things. This perspective shifts attention from purported impacts of algorithms on 
society to the variety of algorithmic associations that need to be established, as well as the 
conditions which render them more or less stable.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. We begin by discussing how algorithms might be 
implicated in power relationships, drawing on the idea of ‘associations’ as a concept. We then 
introduce a study of two algorithmic surveillance systems in order to consider algorithmic 
rules, their design, development and possible effects. By analysing the conditions and conse-
quences of these rules, we show the associations needed to achieve conditions and conse-
quences. We conclude by suggesting that ‘looking for trouble’ – moments of breakdown, fail-
ure or other problems – is productive for emphasising the centrality of associations, rather than 
social power, to achieving algorithmic effects.  
 
 
Algorithms and power 
 
A number of authors have recently considered algorithmic power. For example, Lash (2007, p. 
71) argues: “power is increasingly in the algorithm.” Beer (2009, p. 994) further suggests: “al-
gorithms have the capacity to shape social and cultural formations and impact directly on indi-
vidual lives.” Spring (2011) argues that algorithms trap individuals and control their lives, 
while Slavin (2011, n.p.) is clear that algorithms: “acquire the status of truth...They become 
real.” Within these accounts of algorithmic activity, it is the algorithms which are the entities 
of concern; the algorithms are noted as powerful, agential and central to the distribution of 
consequences. These concerns lead to various calls (Kitchin, forthcoming; Seaver, 2013; Dia-
kopolous, 2013) for algorithms to be held to account, governed and regulated. However, the 
challenge in accomplishing such a task is made complicated by proprietary interest in keeping 
algorithms enclosed, the technical difficulties involved in making an algorithm transparent 
(Slavin, 2011) or the problems involved in removing algorithms from their black boxes 
(Bucher, 2012).  
 
This suggests two problematic issues: first, algorithms are agential, powerful and consequen-
tial; second, algorithms are almost impossible to know. However, several recent studies point 
toward possibilities for engaging up close with algorithms in order to explore their technicali-
ties and consequences (as this paper will also do) and recent studies have begun to question 
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some of the power attributed to algorithms. Hence, Drucker (2013: n.p.) argues that although 
algorithms are instructions for processes “whose outcomes may usually be predictable,” algo-
rithms can also be “as open to error and random uncertainties in their execution as they are to 
uncertain outcomes in their use.” Diakopoulos (2013, p. 2) also suggests algorithms can be 
beneficial, but also involved in mistakes. This focus on algorithmic mistakes might not dimin-
ish the concerns we have with algorithms (their mistakes may be just as consequential and 
difficult to account for), but it does seem to modify somewhat the ways we might engage with 
algorithmic power. Instead of treating the algorithm as agential and consequential, we might 
also have to explore its limitations and the problems it causes for those people, organisations 
and activities which have become arrayed through algorithms.  
 
Other work pushes these points further. For example, Kushner (2013, p. 1242) suggests that in 
the case of translation, algorithms need human “help” in order to become a “freelance transla-
tion machine, an assemblage of circuits and flesh that transforms text from one language to 
another with a computer’s efficiency and the sensitivity of the human mind.” Furthermore, 
Hallinan and Striphas (2014) argue, in their study of an online recommendation system, that 
the algorithm cannot work with various oddities in customer preference and instead of being 
resolved, these oddities need to be worked around. In these accounts, not only is the algorithm 
made accessible to research, it is also decentred in its agential consequences. The algorithm 
needs assistance.  
 
Taken together with recent studies of algorithms in STS (Gillespie, 2011, 2014; Neyland, 2015) 
and geography (Kitchin, forthcoming), this suggests we need to understand the algorithm-in-
action as situated (Suchman et al, 2002) among a variety of people, things, processes, docu-
ments, resources and technologies. It suggests we could use this situated-ness to explore a dis-
tinct approach to power which shifts attention away from the algorithm as the agential and 
consequential entity. Treating the algorithm as the agential entity requires an approach to power 
predicated on an asymmetrical distribution of the ability to create consequences for others. In 
this way algorithms would hold power over those subject to algorithmic decision making 
through this asymmetry. If we instead treat asymmetry as an achieved effect, we can explore 
how asymmetries are composed.  
 
One means to do so would be to extend Latour’s (2005) work on association into algorithms. 
Latour (2005) suggests that associations are forms of interaction through which things take a 
social shape. However, according to Latour, one should not jump from recognising the pres-
ence of an interaction, to considering that interaction is characterised by a social force (2005: 
65). In this way, power (as social force) does not precede interaction, neither is it a property of 
ossified societal structures, nor is it a context “which makes the many participants in the action 
move,” (2005, p. 83). Instead: “Power and domination have to be produced, made up, com-
posed.” (Latour, 2005, p. 64). Rather than treating power as resulting from an asymmetrical 
distribution of the ability to create a consequence for others, this line of argument suggests 
making sense of asymmetries through close study of the on-going associations through which 
an asymmetrical effect is achieved. This approach does not then deny that algorithms might 
participate in producing asymmetrical consequences, but instead explores how asymmetrical 
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effects are achieved. To understand the ways in which algorithms are tied up with forms of 
power, we might thus explore their associations. If we follow Latour (2005), we would not 
look to explain power as an agential characteristic of algorithms, but instead seek to make sense 
of asymmetries composed through the associational life of algorithms. However, in recognising 
the situated character of algorithms, we need to provide precise detail on the nature of such 
algorithmic associations. In order to further explore the ways in which situated algorithms pro-
duce asymmetrical effects through their associations we will turn attention to our empirical 





This paper engages with two, 3 year-long projects which experimented with video analytic 
algorithms. Video analytics is a developing field in which algorithms and associated soft-
ware/code sift through streams of digital video data, selecting out data that fits within pre-
scribed patterns of relevance. Such patterns are often referred to as moments of ‘event detec-
tion’ in which algorithms and associated software/code demarcate relevant from irrelevant data 
and draw the relevant data to others’ attention. In our pursuit of algorithmic association and the 
means by which asymmetrical effects are achieved, this initial distinction of relevance and 
irrelevance is key – to be deemed ‘relevant’ rather than ‘irrelevant’ can often mean to be noted 
or not within a video analytic surveillance system. Yet to produce such an asymmetry and 
maintain the relevance-irrelevance demarcation requires continuing effort, as we will go on to 
explore. 
 
Briefly stated, the two projects that we will consider were designed to work in the following 
way. Daniel’s project involved a management consultancy firm as co-ordinators, a large tech-
nology firm, two teams of academic computer scientists and a team of social scientists given 
ethnographic access to the project. The project also involved a national European rail operator 
and a large city airport where the system would be developed and tested. An experimental aim 
of the research was to work through the possibilities of using algorithms to detect events such 
as people moving in the wrong direction (counter flow) through airport security or through 
entry and exit points of train stations, moving into inappropriate areas (intrusion) such as train 
tracks or closed airport offices, and abandoned luggage.  
 
Norma’s project involved behaviour analysis software for video surveillance systems. The pro-
ject incorporated four teams of academic researchers (computer scientists, geoscientists, and 
legal scholars), two private research institutes (the members of which were mainly computer 
scientists by training), a consulting agency that carried out cost-benefit analyses, an IT com-
pany which was supposed to integrate the system for technology transfer, as well as officers 
from regional police crime units who were expected to share their expertise in detecting crim-
inal behaviour. The group’s goal outlined in the grant proposal was to mechanize surveillance 
processes in order for the system to identify ‘dangerous’ situations and behaviour automatically 
and in real-time and send alerts to operators who would no longer have to watch screens at all 
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times. The idea was to facilitate intervention before the fact, and would also reduce personnel 
cost through automation. The project was funded by the German government. 
 
In the following sections we consider three areas of activity that provide insight into the situated 
character of algorithmic systems and enable us to explore more precisely the forms of associ-
ation involved and how these go toward building asymmetries. We will begin by looking at the 
algorithms themselves and the means by which they establish conditions and consequences. 
We will then explore the further work required to achieve these conditions (through classifica-
tions and maps) and consequences (through bricolage and demonstrations). 
 
 
Algorithmic IF…THEN rules 
The algorithms for event detection used in video analytic systems are a designed product. They 
take effort and work and thought and often an amount of re-working. The algorithms establish 
a set of rules which are designed to contribute to demarcating relevant from irrelevant video 
data. In this way, such rules could be noted as central to the kinds of algorithmic power that 
generate asymmetries between people and things that can be ignored and people and things that 
might need further scrutiny. If such a focus could hold together, the rules would be central to 
the ‘power’ of algorithms. The following algorithmic rules were developed for detecting aban-




















Figure 1: IF…THEN rules for abandoned luggage 
 
 
What seems most apparent in these rules is the IF…THEN structure. At its simplest, the ‘IF’ 
acts as a condition and the ‘THEN’ acts as a consequence. In this particular algorithm the 
IF distance between person and luggage is above threshold
THEN detect person away from luggage
IF person remains away from luggage for time >T
THEN detect luggage still unattended
IF left luggage detected
AND left object inside area detected
AND person away from the luggage detected
AND luggage still unattended detected
THEN detect abandoned luggage
IF a new object appears inside the screen
AND this object belongs to the class luggage
AND this luggage was separated from the object person
THEN detect left luggage
IF a new object appears inside the screen
AND position this object is inside the area




IF…THEN rules were designed to operate in the following way. IF an object was detected 
within an area (for example a train station or airport under surveillance), THEN the object 
could be tentatively allocated the category of potentially relevant. IF that same object was 
deemed to be in the class of objects ‘luggage’ THEN that object could be tentatively allocated 
the category of potentially relevant item of luggage. IF that same luggage shaped object was 
separate from a human shaped object, THEN it could maintain its position as potentially rele-
vant. IF that same luggage shaped object and human shaped object were beyond the distance 
threshold currently set by the system (say 2 or 10 metres) and the same objects were beyond 
the temporal threshold currently set by the system (say 30 seconds or 1 minute) – that is, if the 
luggage and person were sufficiently far apart for sufficiently long, THEN an alarm could be 
sent to surveillance operators. 
 
If this structuring and division of various entities (humans, luggage, time, space, relevance and 
irrelevance), occurred straightforwardly and endured, it might be tempting to argue that this is 
where the social power of algorithms is located or made apparent. A straightforward short-cut 
would be to argue that the algorithm structures the social world and through this kind of state-
ment we could then find Lash’s (2007) powerful algorithm, and Beer’s (2009) algorithm which 
shapes the social world. As a result of an asymmetrical distribution of the ability to cause an 
effect, the algorithm would have social power. However, such a short-cut creates a leap from 
algorithmic rules to their consequences. If instead we pay attention to the situated work re-
quired for algorithmic conditions and consequences to be achieved, what we find is not that the 
algorithm structures the social world. Instead, efforts are made (and fail, are re-made, re-
worked and then sometimes fail again or work to a small extent) to constitute the conditions 
required for the structure or the structure gets re-written to fit new versions of the conditions. 
This continual re-writing and efforts to achieve conditions and consequences is axiomatic to 
computer science but is also where associations are made, and are made available for scrutiny. 
It is also where the asymmetry between relevant and irrelevant data is continuously in the pro-
cess of being made. In the following analysis of algorithmic conditions and consequences we 
will explore the associational effort required to constitute a structure that gives asymmetrical 
effect to algorithmic rules. 
 
 
Achieving Conditions  
In the two projects we consider in this paper, for the IF conditions of an event detection algo-
rithm to be achieved required co-ordinated work to bring together everyday competences 
(among surveillance operators and computer scientists), the creation of new entities (including 
lines of code), the further development of components (from algorithmic rules to new forms of 
classification) and the development of particular theories of the world in which the algorithms 
would operate (such as a train station or airport), but also subtle changes in that world. These 
continual associations were the basis for achieving conditions. In order to illustrate the com-
plexity of achieving conditions, we will focus here on a comparison of the two projects’ work 




Achieving Conditions – Classifications: Both projects depended on classification work to bring 
about a condition necessary for the algorithmic system to asymmetrically divide relevant data 
from irrelevant data. However, classification systems are necessarily incomplete – there is al-
ways something that ‘falls through the cracks’ (Bowker and Star, 2000). This incompleteness 
means that ambiguity about the objects and subjects to which algorithms refer is inserted into 
the development process. To varying degrees, developers then need to create workarounds to 
compensate for such incompleteness. In extreme cases, the world the algorithms are supposed 
to refer to has to be remodelled (and simplified) according to the availability of data. 
 
In Daniel’s project for an event detection algorithm to pick out, for example, an item of suspi-
cious luggage and issue an alarm to operators, various classifications had to be made. Objects 
had to be classified, for example, as luggage shaped or human shaped and the states of those 
objects also required classification, for example, as moving or not moving. Object classifica-
tion involved algorithmically sifting through the stream of digital data produced by the video 
surveillance system in the airport and train stations. Classification depended upon models that 
were built to parameterise potential objects. This involved establishing edges around what a 
human-shaped object was likely to be (in terms of height, width and so on). Other models then 
had to be built to parameterise other objects, such as luggage, cleaners’ trolleys, sign posts and 
other non-permanent attributes of the settings under surveillance. The models relied on 200-
point vector analysis to set in place what made up the edges of the object under consideration 
and then to which model those edges suggested the object belonged. This was designed to 
produce rapid, real-time classifications within the airport and train station.  
 
Parameterisation was presented by the computer scientists as a form of classification that the 
developing algorithmic system could manage without using too much processing power (as it 
also had to take on other tasks) and without having to take too much time. In this way, param-
eterisation would act as an initial but indefinite basis for object classification that could be 
confirmed by surveillance operators when shown images of, for example, an apparently suspi-
cious item of luggage.   
 
In Daniel’s project object classification did not just depend on parameterisation. Object track-
ing was required to ascertain the state of the objects being classified. To achieve the conditions 
established in the IF…THEN rules of Figure 1, the system had to identify that a potential item 
of luggage was no longer moving and its human owner had moved at least a certain distance 
from the luggage and for a certain time. In order to track objects that had been given an initial 
and hesitant classification, human shaped objects and luggage shaped objects would be given 
a bounding box. This was a digitally imposed stream of meta-data that would create a box 
around the object according to its already established edges. The box would then be given a 
metadata identity according to its dimensions, location within the airport or train station (for 
example, which camera it appeared on) and its direction and velocity. IF a human shaped object 
split from a luggage shaped object, IF the human shaped object continued to move, IF the 
luggage shaped object remained stationary, IF the luggage shaped object and human shaped 
object were over a certain distance apart and IF the human shaped object and luggage shaped 
object stayed apart for a certain amount of time, THEN this would achieve the conditions under 
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which the algorithmic system could issue an alert. In place of the algorithm (in the form of 
IF…THEN rules) having power, it seems instead that a series of people, things, actions and 
relations have to come about to provide a set of conditions through which an asymmetry can 
be composed, relevant data divided from irrelevant data and an event detected. In this sense, 
the algorithmic system comes to be what it is through a carefully maintained series of associa-
tions (Latour, 2005); it is the associations through which any sense of power might be said to 
operate and any asymmetry between relevant and irrelevant data achieved. 
 
The importance of these associations can be made clear by comparing the forgoing analysis 
with classification in Norma’s project. Here, the focus was not specifically on objects and peo-
ple, but rather the actions of people in relation to other people. The main event detection algo-
rithm in Norma’s project detected patterns of aggregated movements across the monitored 
space through what the computer scientists termed ‘unsupervised learning’, analysing ‘what 
most people do’. The underlying idea was the following: If a single individual behaves signif-
icantly differently from the majority of people in a given space, then there is an increased 
chance that this person is exhibiting the kind of behaviour the system is supposed to detect. In 
this theory, ‘conformity’ means ‘what most people do,’ and deviance is then designated as 
everything else. Classification would thus operate in the following manner: If a moving object 
was detected within the monitored area, and it could be assigned the class of person, and this 
person’s movement trajectory diverged significantly from the movements of most people in 
this space, then the camera would zoom in on this person, sending an alarm and the live video 
feed to the surveillance operators’ screens. In this second project, then, the algorithmic system 
is nothing without the associational effort to asymmetrically divide normality from abnormal-
ity. 
 
Before one jumps too swiftly to assume that algorithms ‘have’ associational power and that 
this creates effects, it should be noted that this particular arrangement (using unsupervised 
learning to distinguish normal and abnormal behaviour) itself emerged from failure. Initial pro-
ject aims involved classifying actions into ‘dangerous’ and ‘safe’ behaviour. Here the research-
ers had struggled with three interrelated problems: First, they recognized that social behaviour 
is indexical and can only be meaningfully understood in its context. For them, this meant that 
they were not able to teach the algorithm how to meaningfully interpret behaviour in order to 
make definitive decisions. The behaviour was situated. One example they frequently raised 
was how they would be able to tell whether converging movement trajectories (two people 
moving towards each other) meant that these people were engaging in, for example, illegal 
substance trade or simply having a friendly conversation. Second, the police officers in the 
project were not able to turn their implicit police knowledge (they had learned in years of train-
ing) into knowledge explicit enough to satisfy the software requirements for well-defined cat-
egories and rules (cf. Sacks, 1972; Goodwin, 1994). Third, because the researchers conse-
quently had more discretion over the definition of ‘dangerous’ behaviour than they wished for, 
they did not want to assume responsibility for potentially making wrong decisions. In this 
sense, to assume that the algorithms ‘have’ power is to overlook the entangled associations of 
people, things, decisions, processes and resources within which the algorithm is situated and 
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from which effects are noted (or not), and, from which moment, changes are made (or not). As 
one researcher noted: 
 
“You know, the rules don’t fall from the sky, someone has to specify them. Ideally, the person 
who runs the transportation hub puts in his knowledge. But really, the core of the problem is 
this: What is aberrant behaviour, and what is the concrete situation? … There is definitely a 
knowledge gap between theory and practice, the police and us. Experts are capable of certain 
classifications that you simply cannot imitate with technical means.” (Norma’s field notes, Sep-
tember 2011) 
 
What we can note here is that the associations are not a straightforward condition to be achieved 
– there are various ways in which algorithmic rules and software/code might be written, various 
aims put forward and changed, various early test results that require changes, different claims 
to expertise that require consideration and expectations of expertise that require revision. How 
different associations are made (between different people and objects, between assumptions 
about what a stream of video data does tell us or can tell us about suspicion or normalcy), 
operates in conjunction with a continual reconsideration of the conditions to be achieved. The 
conditions to be achieved will change with the associations. In this sense it is too simplistic to 
suggest that algorithms ‘have’ power; any accomplishment of effect emerges from continual 
reconfigurations of the entities involved. It is an occasional accomplishment of effect (in other 
words, the system manages to do something) that can lead to either a conformation or a re-
writing of the conditions to be achieved. Asymmetries, such as demarcations of relevant from 
irrelevant data, can then also change as an upshot of transformations in the conditions achieved 
through the work of the project participants. 
 
Achieving Conditions – Mapping: The contrast between achieving a condition and maintaining 
it as part of the algorithmic system and not achieving a condition and so re-writing the basis 
for what ought to count as an effect, can be seen in comparisons between the two projects’ 
efforts to map space. In Daniel’s project, in order for an object to be classified (as in the pre-
ceding analysis), first the very notion of a moving object had to be identified and to do this, the 
computer scientists looked to use a standard technique in video analytics: background subtrac-
tion. This method for identifying moving objects was somewhat time consuming and proces-
sor-intensive, but these efforts could be ‘front-loaded’ prior to any active work completed by 
the system. ‘Front-loading’ in this instance meant that a great deal of work would be done to 
produce an extensive map of the fixed attributes of the setting (airport or train station) prior to 
attempts at classification work. Mapping the fixed attributes would not then need to be repeated 
unless changes were made to the setting (such changes included in this project a change to a 
shop front and a change to the lay-out of the airport security entry point). Producing the map 
provided a basis to inform the algorithmic system what to ignore. Fixed attributes were thus 
nominally collated as non-suspicious in ways that people and luggage, for example, could not 
be, as these latter objects could not become part of the map of attributes (the maps were pro-
duced based on empty airports and train stations). Having a fixed map then formed the back-
ground from which other entities could be subtracted. Anything that the system detected that 
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was not part of the map, would be given an initial pixel mask which could then feed into afore-
mentioned processes of object classification and tracking.  
 
In contrast to this approach to mapping, in Norma’s project, the teams of researchers were not 
able to implement their software in the fixed environment needed to make maps. This was 
because the group worked out of different organizations distributed all over Germany, and only 
met every three months to integrate their work; and because they did not cooperate with a 
transportation hub which would put the infrastructure of a monitored space at their disposal. 
This meant that all of the technical equipment had to be moved and reconfigured from lab to 
lab, and to the spaces in which it was to be tested and presented. The many ‘moving parts’ in 
this project highlight the efforts of communication and collaboration and the careful combina-
tion of people, things, processes and resources, which needed to be aligned to achieve the con-
ditions for the algorithms to ‘do’ anything.  
 
The basis for demarcating relevance from irrelevance in both projects was thus distributed be-
tween various different entities (computer scientists and their understanding of spaces such as 
airports, maps that might be programmed to ignore for a time certain classes of objects, classi-
fication systems that might then also – if successful – provide a hesitant basis for selecting out 
potentially relevant objects). Here again it becomes clear that anything that algorithms were 
able to ‘do’ was situated in continual reconfigurations of the entities involved, and that the 
agency of algorithms thus needs to be understood as distributed. The ‘power’ of the algorithmic 
system to asymmetrically divide relevant data from irrelevant data was an upshot of these as-
sociations and not a pre-condition for achieving effects. 
 
What we suggest is that an understanding is required of the achievement of conditions in order 
to make sense of algorithms. This approach is important for emphasising the situated efforts 
required to design a set of algorithmic rules and achieve conditions for their operation (through, 
for example, classification and mapping). We have also tried to show the ways in which algo-
rithms are part of quite precarious arrangements at times, with the very conditions to be 
achieved subject to re-writing according to the effects a system manages to show or not show. 
By considering the effects of an algorithmic system as an upshot of its associations and by 
emphasising the work required to make and maintain and also change those associations, we 
have attempted to move away from any assumption that it is the algorithm itself that is in some 
way powerful. Our suggestion is that asymmetrical effects – such as demarcations between 
relevance and irrelevance – are achieved (if at all) through associations, rather than through a 
pre-condition characteristic of algorithms which gives them the power to act independently on 
people and things. In the next section, we will explore this further through the second part of 
algorithmic IF…THEN rules, moving from conditions to consequences.  
 
 
Achieving Consequences  
Although we have somewhat separated algorithmic conditions and consequences in this paper, 
we would like to stress that in practice achieving conditions is inseparable from achieving con-
sequences. Even a cursory look at Figure 1 will reveal that various IF-conditions and THEN-
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consequences are nested within the single set of algorithmic rules. Moreover, the consequences 
of the algorithmic system (for example, issuing an alarm to operators of the system) cannot be 
achieved without the conditions (making the maps, classifying objects), but the conditions are 
also meaningless without the consequences (the maps are made to aid in the issue of alarms 
and problems with the conditions may lead to a re-writing of anticipated consequences). What 
is clear in the two projects, is that achieving consequences through algorithmic systems in-
volved distinct types of activity in comparison to achieving conditions. We will compare two 
examples of trouble in achieving consequences across the two algorithm projects to highlight 
two different forms of activity that occur in response. Assessing moments where the projects 
ran into trouble is particularly useful as these are where detailed considerations of associations, 
their strengths and failures are made apparent to everyone in the project. Running into trouble 
provides a basis for considering the fragility of such associations. Trouble was also, as we will 
show, a continual matter of concern for the participants in these two algorithm projects. 
 
In Daniel’s project, the main consequence to be achieved was to produce alerts for system 
operators of such matters as abandoned luggage. The computer scientists sought to test out if 
the new algorithmic system could produce such alerts more effectively, or at least as effec-
tively, as the conventional video surveillance system in the end user sites (train stations and an 
airport). Taking the example of abandoned luggage at the airport, operators would convention-
ally scan the monitors in their control room in the airport and seek out items which appeared 
out of place. Items would then be given some scrutiny and if they appeared to be luggage which 
had been abandoned, operators would radio through to security on the terminal floor who would 
move to inspect the item. Operators suggested, on average, they would detect one such object 
per hour. This set a benchmark for the new algorithmic system. The computer scientists set up 
the system to run for 6 hours taking a live feed from the airport cameras and expected to dis-
cover around 6 objects. The system was left to run for 6 hours in the airport as a redundant 
system (conventional surveillance would continue to operate and provide the basis for any nec-
essary interventions). The computer scientists were present in the airport to collect and analyse 
results. They were interested in the number of correct alerts issued, but also the number of false 
positives (seeing things that were not there) and false negatives (not seeing things that were 
there). In the 6 hours that the system ran, in place of detecting approximately 6 items of poten-
tially lost or abandoned luggage, the algorithmic system detected 2654 potentially suspicious 
items.  
 
The working assumption of the computer scientists was that there were likely to be around 
2648 false positives. In later checking of a random sample of alerts, it turned out the system 
was detecting as abandoned luggage such things as reflective surfaces, sections of wall, a cou-
ple embracing and a person studying a departure board. The computer scientists worked 
through the results and identified ‘confounding’ variables such as camera angles not favoured 
by the system (for example being too low and hence unable to see through crowds), changing 
lighting conditions (which cast shadows in different directions, changing the system’s view of 
the edges of objects, their initial classification but also their tracking between frames and cam-
eras), and different flooring materials in different parts of the airport (which meant that certain 
objects stood out against the background in different ways in different spaces). Running into 
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trouble in this way was particularly significant for the project team, as at the time of this test 
they were only weeks away from giving a final demonstration of the technology ‘live’ to the 
project funders. The carefully plaited associations between various entities, which each made 
demands on the system to asymmetrically divide relevant from irrelevant footage, were now to 
be made available for reconsideration. 
 
This kind of trouble was not unusual in algorithm projects. Norma’s project ran into a number 
of issues. For example, having no single fixed location in which to demonstrate the technology 
(such as a transport hub) and having to transport technology to the relevant location on each 
occasion when it would be demonstrated to the funding institution and industry posed signifi-
cant difficulties for the project. Every single part of the system had to be reconfigured to each 
other and to the physical space in which they wanted to demonstrate the technology – associa-
tions were thus made and re-made frequently and at pace, as this note from Norma’s field work 
shows:   
 
Dennis approaches me and asks me what I’m up to. “I just wanted to see the work on the 
cameras, and Marco just explained to me that they’re configuring the cameras.” Dennis 
nods and explains: “Yeah, their problem is that the cameras vibrate. I think they always 
work with fixed cameras and you don’t have that problem with those.” I don’t understand. 
“Well, we only were allowed to attach the cameras with strings, and in order not to damage 
the columns we put foam in between; but that’s not helping the problem, either. And they’re 
not able to calculate the errors out”. (Norma’s field notes, November 2011) 
 
In the above case, vibrating cameras meant that the tracking algorithms mistook their own 
movement for movement in the monitored space, and this in turn meant that it would track 
every single pixel in the image. In a quite literal sense no asymmetry could be drawn between 
relevant and irrelevant data as every pixel was constituted as potentially in need of further 
scrutiny. Further trouble emerged when construction workers changed the pattern of the floor 
tiles in the days preceding a project demonstration (see below), which was a serious problem 
for synchronizing the cameras with the other system components. Finally, other events in the 
hall during the preceding weeks repeatedly changed the appearance of the monitored space 
which meant that producing the maps needed to reduce processing resources was continuously 
interrupted. In other words, the architecture, construction workers, other events in the hall, and 
a variety of other factors intervened with the functioning of the algorithmic system. Associa-
tions were made radically contingent by the continual uncertainties posed by moving compo-
nents from one location to another; as the vibrating cameras showed, components and thus their 
ability to associate, were transformed by changing locations. Encountering these kinds of trou-
ble caused problems for the project’s attempt to demonstrate the utility of the technology to the 
funders and a wider audience: 
 
Everyone is gathered around the big touch screen in the hall. Other than the researchers, 
there are industry representatives, police officers, security services companies, and the 
funding institution representatives present. Dennis introduces the “use case”: he explains 
that someone will steal the painting they put in the middle of the hall, and that the system 
will send an alarm to the screen when that happens. This would be based on the analysis of 
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the video material. “So who wants to steal the painting? Jakob?” Before Jakob can answer, 
a very excited looking Professor Bode jumps up, raises her hand, and walks towards the 
painting. Everyone’s heads turn back and forth between her and the screen, looks of antic-
ipation on their faces. The professor finally reaches out to the painting and takes it from its 
easel. Everyone’s attention shifts to the screen. Anticipation turns into extreme awkward-
ness when nothing happens. The researchers look at the screen with horror. Dennis tries to 
salvage the situation with some self-deprecating humour: “I forgot to say that this is also 
an opportunity to see work in progress” (Norma’s field notes, November 2011) 
 
In a similar manner to the computer scientists in Daniel’s project who had to post-rationalise 
failure in their abandoned luggage test, here the computer scientists had to work to come up 
with a means to narrate the collapse of associations. They suggested that tiny errors in the 
messaging formats – such as a missing hyphen – could cause malfunction as the analysis algo-
rithm would send a message to the graphical user interface which could not be read. Both pro-
jects, then, faced problems in achieving the kinds of consequences they had initially anticipated 
– both primarily focused on issuing alerts to operators.  
 
We can note across both projects two common types of response to trouble. A first type of 
response can be most clearly illustrated through Norma’s project. This response to trouble oc-
curred both in their everyday work, as well as on occasions of demonstrations, and involved 
continual tinkering with code. A kind of on-going bricolage (MacKenzie and Pardo-Guerra, 
2014) took place through which ideas of what the surveillance system was supposed to achieve 
were translated into rules and commands that could be read and executed by a computer. And 
when trouble emerged in achieving consequences, computer scientists would search for bits of 
code in open source libraries, piece these together and modify them, test them, and if they did 
not work the first time, look for the source of error. This was dull, routine work, often not 
welcomed by the computer scientists.1 It was also irritatingly complicated for the computer 
scientists; as the code ran to hundreds of thousands of lines and was drawn together on occa-
sions from existing non-proprietary sources which were not fully understood by the computer 
scientists, searching for errors was very time-consuming. Associations within the hundreds of 
thousands of lines of code had to be dragged to attention by computer scientists, inspected and 
passed or altered. The following event illustrates a typical situation of what happened when 
this kind of trouble was encountered: 
 
I ask Marco if they also thought to include parameters such as age and gender. He declines, 
but says that he’s working on such algorithms in a different project. He gets really excited 
and offers to demonstrate the algorithm. “And how does it work?” I ask. I’m interested 
whether the algorithm is based on machine learning, or classifications made by developers. 
“Well the computer learns what features to look for” he replies. He moves his laptop to a 
different desk and connects to one of the PTZ cameras in the room. He runs the program 
and a window pops up on the screen, showing the camera footage of Marco and me looking 
at his laptop screen. Marco adjusts the camera so my face is centred on the screen. He points 
                                                          
1 In Norma’s project not every computer scientist understood coding as part of their work, and troubleshooting, 
debugging, and tinkering often were seen as nuisances. Such differential valuation of tasks in developing algo-
rithmic systems is a topic which deserves investigation in its own right. 
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to numbers and letters which appear next to my face, and to my great amusement the algo-
rithm tells us that I’m a man in my mid-40s [despite being female and in my mid-twenties]. 
While I’m still laughing, I see that Marco isn’t so amused. He opens the window with the 
code and starts looking through the lines of code, mumbling “hmmm...but this looks pretty 
good...why doesn’t it work... I can comment this line out, although it’s nice, but...”. He 
crouches behind his laptop, starts typing and mumbling to himself and the screen, and stops 
paying attention to me. (Norma’s field notes, May 2011) 
 
This kind of routine response to trouble involved continual iterations of translating conse-
quences into code, by piecing together bits of software the computer scientists took from open 
source libraries, fitting them together, modifying them to their needs, testing the software, look-
ing for bugs, troubleshooting, and then doing it all over again. Rather than understanding cod-
ing as a straightforward, planned, and throughout intentional activity, we need to understand it 
as importantly including tinkering, troubleshooting, debugging, and finding workarounds – a 
kind of bricolage (MacKenzie and Pardo-Guerra, 2014) through which associations between 
entities are continually reconfigured and the nature of entities also called to consideration, prior 
to any consequences at some point being accomplished.  
 
A second type of response to trouble can be illustrated through [Author 1]’s project. The project 
team looked to respond to the problems met in attempting to identify abandoned luggage ‘live’ 
in the airport. The disappointing results of these tests might appear to undermine assertions 
regarding the ‘power’ of the algorithm to achieve much at all. However, within a few weeks of 
the abandoned luggage tests being carried out, the algorithmic system was successfully demon-
strated ‘live’ in the airport to research funders. The response to trouble in this project did not 
focus so much on bricolage as what we might term the production of a contained effect (draw-
ing inspiration from the work of Muniesa and Callon, 2007). A laboratory, according to Mu-
niesa and Callon (2007), creates a set of controlled and contained conditions idealised for the 
demonstration of a specific effect. Any attempt to achieve this same effect in moving out into 
the world beyond the laboratory would require extending the controlled conditions of the la-
boratory out into the world. Within the controlled and contained conditions of the laboratory, 
the associations would be at their purest, with no confounding variables. To transform a busy 
airport into such a controlled environment in order to demonstrate an algorithmic contained 
effect would also require that the airport in a small, contained way would become the algorith-
mic system’s purified laboratory. 
 
Making the system work, creating a contained effect, required careful management of the dif-
ferent components and their associations. The ‘confounding variables’ of crowds, distinct 
flooring materials and inconsistent lighting that had been held responsible for the previous poor 
results, would have to be managed away from the system in transforming the airport into the 
laboratory. The airport was monitored by the project co-ordinators with advice from the air-
port’s security manager to ascertain when there were fewest crowds. If fewer people moved 
through the airport there was a reduced chance that objects the system needed to parameterise, 
classify and track (such as luggage shaped objects) would be occluded (for example, by multi-
ple legs walking between the camera and object). Also, if the abandoned luggage object were 
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to be initially tracked in the moments prior to abandonment between certain locations and cam-
eras where the lighting conditions and flooring conditions were consistent (for example, in 
those areas towards the rear of the terminal away from natural light where the floors were 
covered with non-reflective grey tiles) this might ‘idealise’ conditions for a test. If the person 
shaped object ‘abandoning’ the luggage shaped object could also leave the luggage in a location 
where it was not occluded from cameras (by, for example, a pillar) and then the person shaped 
object were to also leave via a route with consistent lighting conditions and flooring materials, 
this would further ‘idealise’ the airport in order that it might become the algorithmic system’s 
laboratory. Finally, if the luggage shaped object being abandoned fitted a particular set of pa-
rameters, this might aid the system in accomplishing object classification as it would ‘know’ 
what it was looking for.  
 
The response to trouble was thus to produce a contained effect by contriving a set of laboratory 
conditions for showing research funders that the system ‘worked’ – at least within a narrowly 
bounded set of associations that could endure within one part of the airport and for one moment. 
The research funders were made aware that an item of luggage was unlikely to be abandoned 
in the airport at precisely the time they were present for a demonstration and elements of the 
‘abandonment’ would be staged. However, this abandonment might still appear somewhat gen-
uine – or less contained – if the algorithmic system itself did not ‘know’ of the artifice of 
laboratory conditions. If the system was sifting through the streams of digital video data, using 
maps to perform background subtraction, object classification through parameterisation and 
tracking to issue an alarm for abandoned luggage – in other words, if the system was operating 
within the set of associations initially marked out by the computer scientists – and while oper-
ating within these associations, the system could pick up the item of abandoned luggage, this 
might still demonstrate the system’s effectiveness in demarcating relevance from irrelevance. 
But knowledge of the abandonment was not so unevenly distributed between funders, human 
project participants and the algorithmic system.  
 
Producing an ‘idealised’ contained space by filtering out confounding variables as far as pos-
sible, provided a prior basis for background subtraction, parameterisation and then subsequent 
classification and tracking. In this way, the associations of the algorithmic system could endure 
as the system ‘knew’ what it was looking for, where and when and what it ought to do next. As 
a result, the ‘abandoned’ luggage was identified by the system during the demonstration; this 
success was the result of the contained effect. The project team did not need to reproduce the 
contained effect in the world beyond the ‘idealised’ conditions of this particular space and time 
of the airport. Instead, the possibilities of achieving the same effect in the world outside the 
laboratory-airport only needed to be pointed towards.2 Much of this pointing, involved critiqu-
ing existing airport terminals for their inadequate architecture (such as low ceilings), poor light-
ing and flooring, and outdated cameras systems. In other words, any future failure of the algo-
rithmic system’s associations to endure beyond the contained effect achieved in this particular 
                                                          
2 Future research could explore the questions raised by the on-going operation of algorithmic systems beyond 




airport, could be explained through the absence of conditions which favoured the algorithmic 
system. For the algorithm to demonstrate and consistently produce an asymmetrical effect by 
distinguishing relevant and irrelevant video data, required the rest of the world (or at least those 
locations where the system would be used) to match those conditions of the contained effect 





We have argued in this paper for the importance of moving away from considering algorithms 
as having social power in the sense that the algorithm itself would be noted as the agential 
character in the drama, able to cause an effect on society. Instead, we have suggested it is 
necessary to recognise the situated character of algorithmic systems. That is, algorithmic sys-
tems come to make sense through their situated-ness, wherein distinct components are designed 
and re-worked and come together with rules, people, processes and specific kinds of relation-
ships. We have sought to extend existing work on algorithmic systems (Gillespie, 2011; Ney-
land, 2015)  by drawing on the work of Latour (2005), to explore a particular approach to 
power. This has enabled us to move from a treatment of algorithms as having power derived 
from an asymmetrical distribution of the ability to act independently on others, to exploring 
asymmetries as an achievement and ‘power’ as constituted through associations. Such an ap-
proach does not entail abandoning the idea that consequences follow from the introduction of 
algorithmic systems. But it does mean, that, if we want to understand how algorithms are im-
plicated in power relationships, we need to cast a wider net and explore the heterogeneous 
practices and materials, going everywhere from labs, companies and control rooms to trans-
portation hubs. 
 
We were particularly interested in the ways in which algorithmic systems became involved in 
the production of an asymmetric effect, distinguishing relevant from irrelevant data. Our pur-
pose in turning to associations is to direct attention to the ways in which such effects as the 
production of asymmetries are made and endure (or collapse) through the composition (and 
decomposition) of associations.  
 
The algorithmic IF…THEN rules of the projects analysed in this paper provided a basis for 
considering particular types of associations and the effects that emerged. In particular we ex-
plored the IF-conditions of classification and mapping and the THEN-consequences and trou-
ble that ensued. We suggested that both classification and mapping were on-going, quite pre-
carious achievements that resulted from the associating of a number of different kinds of enti-
ties and distributions of roles and responsibilities which followed from the articulation of con-
ditions that also either confirmed or led to a re-writing of those conditions. The trouble that 
occurred for both projects in trying to achieve consequences – namely the issue of an alert to 
surveillance system operators as a product of successfully producing an asymmetrical distribu-
tion between relevant and irrelevant data – was instructive for shedding further light on the 
nature of algorithmic associations. Both projects were characterised by an on-going failure of 




First, project members responded to trouble through a kind of on-going bricolage. In [Author 
2]’s project, failure to recognise expected features of the world (the theft of a painting and 
[Author2]’s age and gender), led to bricolage in the form of searches in software libraries for 
pre-existing solutions, efforts to stop cameras vibrating, dredging up lines of code from within 
the system, and everything from external confounding variables to hyphens in lines of code 
were made available for re-inspection. Similar tinkering took place in [Author 1]’s project in 
trying to repair classifications. Second, project members also responded to trouble – for exam-
ple, a failure to detect abandoned luggage or dangerous behaviour – by producing a contained 
effect. In [Author1]’s project, a small section of the airport where the demonstration would 
take place was transformed into a controlled, laboratory-like space in which confounding var-
iables could be manipulated away from the algorithmic system as a basis for demonstrating 
that effects could be achieved (albeit under very purified conditions). In [Author2]’s project 
the same was true for the University hall in which they demonstrated the technology a second 
time. 
 
What we would like to suggest is that this focus on association, while de-centring the algorithm 
as the cause of effects, also points up what we might term the associational dependencies re-
quired for the algorithmic system to operate. The need to continually re-work the bases for 
doing classification and mapping, the purification of conditions required to demonstrate the 
contained effect and the bricolage necessary for re-working failed lines of code, all suggest 
particular kinds of associational dependence. Classification could not happen without maps or 
stable cameras or pre-defined parameters, maps could not happen without a stable location or 
co-ordinated effort to continually work out the permanent attributes of a setting, contained ef-
fects could not be demonstrated without purification and the exclusion of confounding varia-
bles and bricolage could not take place without computer scientists, their training and open 
source libraries. Our suggestion is that future studies of algorithms pay further attention to these 
associational dependencies – it is through making and holding together these dependencies that 
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